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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Philadelphia Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing & 
Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, also known as Unite! 
["the Union"], appeals from the district court's order staying 
the action before it pending the final completion of related 
proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board. The 
action was filed pursuant to section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, as amended, by Cofab, Inc., 
seeking an injunction and an order vacating and/or staying 
enforcement of an arbitrator's award finding that Cofab was 
the alter ego and successor of DA Clothing Co. The Union 
filed a counterclaim to enforce the award. Cofab filed a 
motion to stay, which the district court granted, and the 
Union appeals. Before we can consider the merits of the 
Union's agreement, we must decide whether we have 
jurisdiction over the district court's order granting a stay. 
 
I. 
 
DA Clothing Company, the alleged predecessor to Cofab, 
operated a manufacturing facility in Clifton Heights, 
Pennsylvania, and was a party to a Collective Bargaining 
Agreement ("CBA") with the Union. On December 17, 1993, 
the company closed its doors without giving any notice to 
the Union. The following month, the son of the former 
owner of DA Clothing opened a new non-union plant, under 
the name Cofab, Inc., about fifteen minutes away from the 
location of DA Clothing. Cofab hired many of the former 
employees of DA Clothing, retained much of DA Clothing's 
equipment, and serviced the same single customer. 
 
In March 1994, the Union filed an unfair labor practice 
charge against Cofab with the National Labor Relations 
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Board, asserting that, as the successor and alter ego of DA 
Clothing, Cofab was bound by the collective bargaining 
agreement between DA Clothing and the Union. Following 
a two-day hearing in January 1995, an Administrative Law 
Judge determined that Cofab was a successor to, but not 
an alter ego of, DA Clothing. Joined by the Union, the 
General Counsel of the NLRB filed exceptions to the ALJ's 
determination that Cofab was not an alter ego. There was 
a hearing in Washington, D.C., after which the NLRB 
issued its decision on September 5, 1996, concluding that 
Cofab and DA Clothing were alter egos, and that Cofab was 
therefore obligated to comply with the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement between DA Clothing and 
the Union. On September 30, 1996, however, the NLRB 
General Counsel filed a motion to modify or clarify the 
NLRB's order. Both parties assumed that this motion 
remained pending up to the time of oral argument on this 
appeal. 
 
Buoyed by the NLRB finding that Cofab was an alter ego 
of DA Clothing, in October 1996 the Union filed a request 
for expedited arbitration of its grievances pursuant to the 
collective bargaining agreement between the Union and DA 
Clothing. Cofab sought a temporary restraining order in the 
district court to stay the arbitration. The district court 
denied the request for a stay, stating that Cofab could 
present its jurisdictional argument to the arbitrator. At the 
arbitration hearing in November 1996, Cofab appeared only 
for the purpose of registering its objection that the 
arbitrator lacked jurisdiction over Cofab on the ground that 
it was not a party to the CBA, and was not subject to its 
terms. The arbitration nevertheless proceeded in Cofab's 
absence. 
 
On January 31, 1997, the arbitrator filed his opinion and 
award. The arbitrator rejected Cofab's jurisdictional 
objection and in a written opinion noted that the facts 
presented before him were the same as the facts presented 
before the Administrative Law Judge of the NLRB to which 
Cofab had not filed exceptions. He found that the two real 
principals of DA Clothing Company were Phyllis D'Amore 
and her son Robert D'Amore, that they closed the operating 
facility and reopened under the Cofab, Inc. name, with 
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Robert D'Amore being designated the chief executive officer 
while his mother occupied some other corporate position 
but that they both participated as they had under the label 
of DA Clothing Co., that their employees were the same, 
and that their one customer was the same, and that 
therefore Cofab meets "all of the contract criteria for being 
deemed a successor" as envisioned by the CBA. App. at 34- 
35. After concluding that Cofab was bound by the CBA, the 
arbitrator ordered Cofab to observe the terms of the CBA, 
and awarded the Union $1,394,529 in damages. App. at 
38-39. 
 
On March 13, 1997, Cofab filed in the district court the 
complaint that initiated this suit in which it sought to 
vacate the award, "and/or for [a] preliminary and 
permanent injunction staying enforcement of [the] 
arbitration award." App. at 4. Cofab stated that if the NLRB 
decision remained unchanged by the motion for 
modification, it intended to appeal to this Court. Cofab 
contended that a stay pending a final decision from the 
NLRB would be appropriate because it would prevent costly 
relitigation in the district court of the same issues 
presented to the ALJ and the NLRB. The Union argued that 
the motion pending before the NLRB requested only a 
clarification of the remedy and did not seek to modify the 
substance of the Board's decision, and it asked the district 
court either to enforce or vacate the award. 
 
The district court declined the Union's request, and 
instead it stayed the action. The district court stated: 
 
       To make any ruling on the arbitrator's award, I would 
       have to determine whether the arbitrator had 
       jurisdiction, an issue that hinges on whether Cofab 
       and DA are alter egos. Accordingly, I would have to 
       make the same determination on alter ego status that 
       has been made by the Board, and that will ultimately 
       be made by the Third Circuit on appeal of the Board's 
       order. The Union rightly points out that the Board and 
       arbitration proceedings are separate proceedings 
       designed to enforce different rights. The central 
       question in each of these proceedings, however, is the 
       same--whether Cofab is the alter ego of DA. Cofab has 
       represented to this court that it will pursue an appeal 
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       to the Third Circuit as soon as the Board certifies its 
       decision. Presumably, the Third Circuit will then rule 
       on Cofab's alter ego status. Under these 
       circumstances, I find that a stay of these proceedings 
       is appropriate. 
 
App. at 122-23. The district court also ordered the parties 
to "keep the court advised of all relevant proceedings." App. 
at 125. The district court docket entries indicate that the 
case was never closed. 
 
The Union filed this appeal contending, preliminarily, 
that the district court erred by not dismissing Cofab's 
complaint because it was filed thirty-six days after the 
issuance of the arbitrator's award, beyond the thirty day 
period to challenge an award set by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 7314. The Union also challenged the stay on the merits, 
arguing that: (1) the stay was inconsistent with the court's 
earlier ruling denying a stay pending arbitration; (2) the 
award can be enforced based upon the undisputed finding 
that Cofab was a successor to DA Clothing; and (3) the 
"stay" did not meet the criteria for the issuance of an 
injunction. 
 
Cofab countered that: (1) the statute of limitation is 
applicable only to parties who signed a CBA, and it argues 
it has no CBA with the Union; (2) it is required to comply 
with the CBA only if it is found to be an alter ego, not 
merely a successor; and (3) a stay was appropriate to avoid 
relitigating the key issue of whether Cofab was an alter ego 
of DA Clothing. 
 
This court sua sponte inquired of the NLRB as to the 
status of the long-pending motion for clarification by the 
General Counsel and learned that the Board, by order 
dated September 15, 1997, granted the motion for 
clarification and amended its September 5, 1996 order to 
state that Cofab employees who were unlawfully denied 
employment at Cofab enjoy the "full make whole" remedies 
provided by statute. The clarification order did not alter the 
Board's essential finding that Cofab is an alter ego of DA 
Clothing. 
 
We note that had either party made appropriate inquiry 
and advised the district court as it requested when the 
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status changed, it is likely that this appeal would not have 
been necessary. Following receipt of this information, we 
requested both parties to submit supplemental briefs on 
this court's jurisdiction, an issue to which we now turn.1 
 
II. 
 
Neither party questioned this Court's jurisdiction in its 
initial submission, apparently based on the assumption 
that the district court's order was an interlocutory 
injunction appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1). This 
court's inquiry as to this issue at oral argument and our 
request for supplemental briefing led to reconsideration by 
the appellee. Cofab now contends that we lack jurisdiction, 
because the underlying order is merely one granting a stay. 
The Union, on the other hand, characterizes the order as 
an injunction because the practical effect has been to 
enjoin the enforcement of the labor arbitration award. 
 
Although the effect on the Union from the district court's 
stay may not be dissimilar from that of an injunction, we 
cannot agree that S 1292(a)(1) is applicable here. The 
district court "enjoined" no party or proceeding but rather 
stayed its own action regarding the arbitration award 
pending the outcome of a final NLRB ruling. The district 
court did not evaluate Cofab's request under the familiar 
criteria for the issuance of injunctive relief. See Gerardi v. 
Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994). The district 
court made only passing reference to harm, a relevant 
factor to be considered in entering an injunction, when it 
noted that a stay would "impose a significant hardship on 
Cofab" and that to "rule on the arbitrator's jurisdiction now 
would be a repetitious and wasteful use of judicial 
resources." App. at 124. Because we cannot characterize 
the stay as a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(a)(1), we must find a basis for our jurisdiction, if 
any, elsewhere. See Allied Air Freight, Inc. v. Pan American 
World Airways, Inc., 340 F.2d 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1965) (stay 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have also learned that on November 17, 1997, the NLRB filed in 
this Court an Application for Enforcement of its Order. See C.A. Nos. 97- 
3596 and 97-3642. That application remains pending. 
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of federal action pending completion of administrative 
proceedings not appealable as preliminary injunction). 
 
Our search for an alternative basis for jurisdiction has 
not been successful. Although the Federal Arbitration Act 
has provisions permitting an appeal from an order that, 
inter alia, denies a petition under the Act to order 
arbitration to proceed or denies an application to compel 
arbitration, see 9 U.S.C. S 16(a)(1), there is no provision 
authorizing an appeal from an interlocutory order granting 
a stay of any award entered after an arbitration. See 
Abernathy v. Southern Cal. Edison, 885 F.2d 525, 530 n.18 
(9th Cir. 1989) (where "order staying the proceeding or 
compelling arbitration is only one step in the judicial 
proceedings and the case can be expected to return to the 
district court, the order is nonfinal and not subject to 
immediate appeal.") 
 
Our research has not disclosed any cases holding that an 
appellate court has jurisdiction to review an order granting 
a stay of enforcement of an arbitration award pending a 
final NLRB decision. The issue arose in Nelson v. 
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 46, 899 
F.2d 1557 (9th Cir. 1990), where the court noted its 
uncertainty about its appellate jurisdiction over a district 
court stay of enforcement of an arbitration award. Because 
the court found jurisdiction permissible on other grounds, 
it expressed no opinion on this issue. However, the court 
stated: 
 
       The Chapter has raised some questions concerning the 
       appealability of the stay issued in the section 301 suit. 
       Although we have ruled that we do not have 
       jurisdiction over appeals from stays pending, or orders 
       compelling, arbitration, we have not determined the 
       appealability of a stay of an action to enforce an 
       arbitral ruling. Without expressing an opinion on the 
       general question of the appealability of a stay of a 
       section 301 action, we believe that the issues raised 
       . . . here are so intertwined that we must uphold the 
       stay . . . . 
 
Id. at 1563 n.5. Cf. Richman Bros. Records, Inc. v. U.S. 
Sprint Communications Co., 953 F.2d 1431 (3d Cir. 1991) 
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(order staying lawsuit while referring a question to Federal 
Communications Commission is not final decision 
reviewable on appeal). 
 
This court has recently had occasion to consider our 
jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court order 
staying proceedings pending resolution of a state court 
action. See Michelson v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., ____ F.3d 
____ , No. 97-5157 (3d Cir. Mar. 11, 1998). The context in 
Michelson was different from that before us here, but in 
that case we had occasion to reiterate Justice Brennan's 
statement that " `the usual rule that a stay is not ordinarily 
a final decision for purposes of S 1291, since most stays do 
not put the plaintiff effectively out of court'." Id., slip op. at 
9 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1983) (internal 
quotations omitted)). See also Marcus v. Township of 
Abington, 38 F.3d 1367, 1370 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Stay orders 
normally are not appealable final orders because they 
merely delay proceedings in the suit."); Schall v. Joyce, 885 
F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1989) (recognizing that Moses H. 
Cone reaffirmed the "usual rule" that a stay is not 
ordinarily a final decision for purposes of S 1291). 
 
This court has recognized that where a stay is indefinite 
and may "unreasonably delay[ ] a plaintiff's right to have his 
case heard," the order may be deemed appealable. Cheyney 
State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 735 (3d 
Cir. 1983). In this case, there is no suggestion that the 
district court intended to "deep six" the suit, an intent we 
also held missing in Cheyney. Id. The district court order 
here merely postponed consideration of the arbitration 
award, and in fact the district court made explicit its 
anticipation of the return of the case by requiring the 
parties to "keep the court advised of all relevant 
proceedings." App. at 125. There is no reason to assume 
that the district court will not rule promptly once it is 
advised that the NLRB has issued its ruling on the extent 
of the make-whole remedy, the issue as to which the 
General Counsel sought clarification. 
 
This case is unlike Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9-10, 
where the stay of the federal suit pending resolution of the 
state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in 
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the federal forum, and is more like Marcus, 38 F.3d at 
1370, where we held that "[a]ppellate review is 
inappropriate here because the stay entered by the district 
court merely delays the federal litigation and does not 
effectively terminate it." See also Schall, 885 F.2d at 104-05 
(same). 
 
We have also considered but reject the possibility that 
this case falls within the small class of collateral orders 
that are reviewable even though they do not terminate the 
underlying litigation under the "collateral order" doctrine 
first announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The collateral order doctrine 
allows an appellate court to review a collateral order that (1) 
finally resolves a disputed question; (2) raises an important 
issue distinct from the merits of the case; and (3) is 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 
Praxis Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 947 
F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1991). The stay order in this case 
could not qualify as a collateral order because, inter alia, it 
does not finally resolve a disputed question but merely 
postpones the district court's decision to enforce or vacate 
the arbitration award. See, generally , Rolo v. General 
Develoment Corp., 949 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1991) (stay order 
that merely delays resolution in the district court not 
reviewable under collateral order doctrine). 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we come to the 
inevitable conclusion that the order granting a stay in this 
case is not an appealable order. There is only one other 
vehicle by which the order could come before us for review 
at this time, i.e., on a petition for mandamus which is 
appropriate when a district court has refused to act on a 
motion within its jurisdiction. Before we would construe the 
appeal as a request for mandamus under 28 U.S.C. S 1651, 
see Cheyney, 703 F.2d at 736, we would have to find that 
the district court committed a clear error " `approach[ing] 
the magnitude of an unauthorized exercise of judicial 
power, or a failure to use that power when there is a duty 
to do so'." Richman Bros. Records, 953 F.2d at 1448 
(quoting Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1069, 1069 (3d Cir. 
1988)). This is not such a case. 
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The Union correctly notes that, as a general matter, the 
"mere possibility of a conflict [between the NLRB and the 
district court] is no barrier to enforcement of the 
[arbitration] award," nor does a "pending charge before the 
NLRB require stay or dismissal of the enforcement suit." 
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 252 v. Standard 
Sheet Metal, Inc., 699 F.2d 481, 483-84 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(citing Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. 
Maloney Specialties, Inc., 639 F.2d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(potential for conflict between arbiter's award and NLRB 
decision does not preclude district court's confirmation of 
award)). 
 
We need not decide how we would rule on the stay if it 
were properly before us for review in the course of an 
appeal. It is not, and nothing about the circumstances in 
this case would impel us to issue a writ of mandamus. See 
United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the 
Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Indust., Local Union No. 525 v. 
Foley, 380 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1967) (denying mandamus 
petition to vacate stay pending outcome of related 
proceedings before NLRB). 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons set forth, this appeal will be dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
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